We tend to focus on regulatory and legislative issues here at CommLawCenter, as that is the common ground for many of our media clients. However, the truth is that—just like our clients—we spend more time working on business issues than regulatory ones. Whether it’s mergers and acquisitions informed by regulatory rules, program negotiations, or novel business arrangements like channel-sharing agreements, the transactions are driven by business needs, regulatory needs, or both.
It sounds like the setup for a joke: a broadcaster, a broker, a banker, a broadcast lawyer, and a backer all walk into a bar. There is no punch line, however, as that will happen innumerable times over the next week, and that just means it’s time for this year’s NAB Show!
What started as a simple gathering of broadcasters and broadcast equipment vendors has grown to mammoth proportions, now encompassing not just broadcasting, but every aspect of content and content delivery, as well as mountains of technology for creating and distributing that content. Billed as “the world’s largest media and entertainment event” with around 100,000 attendees, it is also one of the largest conventions in Las Vegas each year, nearly doubling the attendance (I kid you not) of February’s “World of Concrete” convention.
As it has grown, the NAB Show has become a magnet for those of us that work in and around the industry, as you can accomplish in an afternoon what would otherwise take dozens of plane trips. As a result, lots of transactions are launched or sealed in the confines of the hotels surrounding the Convention Center. While that may not be different from any other week in Vegas, these deals will often involve broadcast stations and program content.
The Great Recession battered all conventions, including the NAB Show, but pre-Show levels of activity seem to indicate that this year’s Show will be a return to form, bringing back people that may have skipped the past few years. Perhaps more important is an accompanying shift in attitude. It seems attendees are back to looking for ways to expand their businesses rather than just survive until economic conditions improve.
I will be there along with the rest of the Pillsbury contingent going this year—Lew Paper, Miles Mason, Lauren Lynch Flick, John Hane, and our newest addition, David Burns. There will be much to see, and I know the other lawyers on Pillsbury’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems team are jealous, as the number of drones on display in the Convention Center will likely exceed that of both the CIA and the Air Force (minus the Hellfire missiles).
So we look forward to seeing you there, and if it isn’t everything you are hoping for, don’t worry; there’s another World of Concrete expo coming in 2016!
The FCC announced in March of this year that it would begin treating TV Joint Sales Agreements between two local TV stations involving more than 15% of a station’s advertising time as an attributable ownership interest. However, it also announced at that time that it would provide parties to existing JSAs two years from the effective date of the new rule to make any necessary modifications to ensure compliance with the FCC’s multiple ownership rule. As I wrote in June when the new rule went into effect, that made June 19, 2016 the deadline for addressing any issues with existing JSAs.
However, the STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014 (STELAR) became law on December 4, 2014. While the primary purpose of STELAR was to extend for an additional five years the compulsory copyright license allowing satellite TV providers to import distant network TV signals to their subscribers where no local affiliate is available, as often happens in Congress, a number of unrelated provisions slipped into the bill. One of those provisions extended the JSA grandfathering period by a somewhat imprecise “six months”.
Today, the FCC released a Public Notice announcing that it would deem December 19, 2016 to be the new deadline for making any necessary modifications to existing TV JSAs to ensure compliance with the FCC’s multiple ownership rule. As a result, in those situations where the treatment of a JSA as an attributable ownership interest would create a violation of the FCC’s local ownership limits, the affected broadcaster will need to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that it has remedied that situation by the December 19, 2016 deadline.
When the FCC voted at its March 31, 2014 meeting to deem television Joint Sales Agreements involving more than 15% of a station’s weekly advertising time as an attributable ownership interest, it announced that broadcasters that are parties to existing JSAs would have two years to modify or terminate those JSAs to come into compliance. However, the FCC’s Report and Order adopting that change to the rules was not released until April 15, 2014, and noted that the effective date of the rule change would be 30 days after the Report and Order was published in the Federal Register.
The Federal Register publication occurred on May 20, 2014, and the FCC today released a Public Notice confirming that the effective date of the JSA attribution rule is therefore tomorrow, June 19, 2014. At that time, the two-year compliance period will also commence, with the deadline for existing JSAs to be modified to come into compliance with the new rule being June 19, 2016. As a result, subject to any actions the courts may take on the matter, all new TV JSAs must comply with the FCC’s multiple ownership rules from their inception, and JSAs that were already in existence before the rule change can remain in place until June 19, 2016.
Pillsbury’s communications lawyers have published FCC Enforcement Monitor monthly since 1999 to inform our clients of notable FCC enforcement actions against FCC license holders and others. This month’s issue includes:
- FCC Proposes $11,000 Fine for Marketing of Unauthorized Device
- $2,944,000 Fine for Robocalls Made Without Recipients’ Consent
- Sponsorship Identification Complaint Leads to $185,000 Consent Decree
- Premature Consummation of Transaction Results in $22,000 Consent Decree
Modifying Design of Parking Meter Requires New FCC Certification and Warning to Users
Earlier this month, the Spectrum Enforcement Division of the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (“NAL”) against a company that designs, develops, and manufactures parking control products (the “Company”). The NAL indicated the Company had marketed one of its products without first obtaining an FCC certification and for failing to comply with consumer disclosure rules. The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau proposed an $11,000 fine against the Company.
In August of 2013, the FCC received a complaint that a particular product made by the Company did not have the required FCC certification and that the product did not comply with consumer disclosure requirements. After receiving the complaint, the FCC’s Spectrum Enforcement Division issued a Letter of Inquiry (“LOI”) to the Company. The Company responded in the middle of March, at which time it described the product in question as a “parking meter that accepts electronic payments made with credit cards, smart cards, or Near Field Communications-enabled mobile device applications.” The response to the LOI indicated that the Company had received an FCC authorization in 2011 but had since refined the design of the product. Although one refinement involved relocating the antenna on the device, which increased the field strength rating from the level authorized in 2011, the Company assumed that the changes to the device qualified as “permissive changes” under Section 2.1043 of the FCC’s Rules. In addition, the Company admitted to marketing the refined product before obtaining a new FCC certification for the increased field strength rating, and that its user manual did not contain required consumer disclosure language. However, the Company had not actually sold any of the new parking meters in the U.S.
Section 302(b) of the Communications Act prohibits the manufacture, import, sale, or shipment of home electronic equipment and devices that fail to comply with the FCC’s regulations. Section 2.803(a)(1) of the FCC’s Rules provides that a device must be “properly authorized, identified, and labeled in accordance with the Rules” before it can be marketed to consumers if it is subject to FCC certification. The parking meter falls under this requirement because it is an intentional radiator that “can be configured to use a variety of components that intentionally emit radio frequency energy.” The Company’s product also meets the definition of a Class B digital device, in that it is “marketed for use in a residential environment notwithstanding use in commercial, business and industrial environments.” Under Section 15.105(b) of the FCC’s Rules, Class B digital devices “must include a warning to consumers of the device’s potential for causing interference to other radio communications and also provide a list of steps that could possibly eliminate the interference.”
The base fine for marketing unauthorized equipment is $7,000, and the base fine for marketing devices without adequate consumer disclosures is $4,000. The Company argued that even though it had marketed the device before it was certified, it had not sold any, and it promptly took corrective action after learning of the issue. The Enforcement Bureau declined to reduce the proposed fines because the definition of “marketing” does not require that there be a sale, and “corrective measures implemented after the Commission has initiated an investigation or taken enforcement action do not nullify or mitigate past violations.” The NAL therefore assessed the base fine for both violations, resulting in a total proposed fine against the Company of $11,000.
Unsolicited Phone Calls Lead to Multi-Million Dollar Fine
Earlier this month, the FCC issued an NAL against a limited liability company (the “LLC”) for making unlawful robocalls to cell phones. The NAL followed a warning issued more than a year earlier, and proposed a fine of $2,944,000. The LLC provides a robocalling service for third party clients. In other words, the LLC’s clients pay it to make robocalls on their behalf to a list of phone numbers provided by the client.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) prohibits robocalls to mobile phones unless there is an emergency or the called party has provided consent. These restrictions on robocalls are stricter than those on live calls because Congress found that artificial or prerecorded messages “are more of a nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by “live” persons.” The FCC has implemented the TCPA in Section 64.1200 of its Rules, which mirrors the statute.
The LLC received an LOI in 2012 from the Enforcement Bureau’s Telecommunications Consumers Division (the “Division”) relating to an investigation of the LLC’s services. The Division required the LLC to provide records of the calls it had made, as well as to submit sound files of the calls. This preliminary investigation revealed that the LLC had placed 4.7 million non-emergency robocalls to cell phones without consent in a three-month period. After making these findings, the Division issued a citation to the LLC in March of 2013, warning that making future calls could subject the LLC to monetary penalties and providing an opportunity to meet with FCC staff and file a written reply. The LLC replied to the citation in April of 2013, and met with FCC staff.
However, in June of 2013, the Division initiated a second investigation to ensure the LLC had stopped making illegal robocalls. The LLC objected, but produced the documents and audio files requested. The Division determined, by analyzing the materials and contacting customers who had received the prerecorded calls made by the LLC, that the Company made 184 unauthorized robocalls to cellphones after receiving the citation. Continue reading →
When CBS and Time Warner announced Monday they had ended their month-long standoff over retransmission of CBS programming on Time Warner cable systems, the announcement brought a sigh of relief from Time Warner subscribers, particularly the NFL fans among them, and the usual press statements putting each party’s best spin on the highly confidential result. However, the real legacy of these negotiations will be to alter how retrans agreements are negotiated in the future, and the somewhat surprising result will be less, not more, retrans blackouts.
When a change in the law in 1992 gave broadcasters the right to negotiate with cable system operators wishing to resell their programming to the public, the idea was to balance the playing field between cable networks, which relied on both ad revenue and a share of cable subscriber fees, and local broadcast stations, which had only ad revenue to support their operations. Prior to that time, broadcasters had effectively subsidized competition from cable because cable system operators could resell broadcast programming without paying for the underlying content, and then use the profits to launch and invest in cable networks that competed with broadcasters for both programming and advertising. These economics are what initiated the migration of sports programming from broadcasting to cable.
In the early retrans negotiations, which I’ll refer to here as Retrans Version 1.0, cable still had local monopolies, leaving broadcasters in the awkward position of attempting to negotiate with a party whose only “competition” was the broadcaster’s free signal. If the broadcaster’s programming disappeared from the local cable system, subscribers couldn’t leave for a new provider. Their only option was to put up an antenna and continue to be a subscriber in order to receive non-broadcast content. Under those circumstances, cable operators didn’t see any reason to pay money for the right to resell broadcast programming–they were the only resellers in town. The result was very few retransmission blackouts, as broadcasters knew that dropping off of the only cable system in town would hurt the broadcaster a lot more than the cable operator.
Unable to obtain money for retrans rights, the compensation broadcasters typically received for permitting retransmission of their signal was the right to program additional channels on the cable system. This cost the cable operator little to nothing while providing it with yet more free content from the broadcaster, making it an easy “give” in retrans negotiations. Ultimately, however, it ended up providing the public with its first great benefit from retransmission negotiations–the launch of a plethora of diverse new program services that not only developed into some of today’s most popular cable networks, but provided an alternative to existing cable networks that were largely owned by the cable systems themselves.
Retrans Version 2.0 commenced after Congress passed the 1999 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, which finally allowed satellite TV to carry local broadcast signals. As a TV service wanting to be competitive to cable, satellite TV operators knew they needed to provide local broadcast signals and fought hard to persuade Congress to change the law to make that a reality. However, lacking the monopoly status enjoyed by most cable systems at the time, satellite TV operators understood they couldn’t replicate the strongarm negotiating tactics that had been employed so successfully by cable operators. Instead, they agreed to pay broadcasters money for the right to retransmit broadcast content, allowing them to attract subscribers away from cable and ultimately end cable’s monopoly. For the first time, broadcasters had competing multichannel providers vying for the right to resell their content to subscribers. As satellite TV’s market share grew, cable operators needed to ensure continued access to the most popular programming on their systems to fend off that competitive threat, and grudgingly began paying for the right to resell broadcast programming as well.
While you might think these competitive developments would have quickly led to a mature market for program retransmission rights with stable pricing, reaching that inevitable destination has been slowed by two factors. The first is simply that the monopoly years of cable so badly distorted market forces that the market for retransmission rights didn’t begin to develop until satellite TV became a competitive force and the retransmission contracts in place in 1999 began to expire, requiring negotiation of new retransmission deals. This occurred much later in markets where satellite-delivered “local into local” service was delayed because of capacity limitations of the satellite systems themselves. Even then, progress was slow for broadcasters, with cable operators being understandably resistant to paying for something they previously saw themselves as receiving for free. One of the best examples of this era is the cable operator who told us during negotiations that he believed paying for the right to retransmit broadcast signals was “unethical” and proceeded to carry my client’s broadcast programming illegally. The negotiation was concluded shortly after the cable operator became the first party ever to be found in violation of the FCC’s rules on good faith retrans negotiations, and the FCC ordered retransmission to cease until an agreement was in place.
Which brings us to the second factor that has delayed countless retrans negotiations and slowed the maturation of the market for broadcast retransmission rights–the possibility of government intervention. Retrans negotiations over the past decade have been conducted with a spectral third party in the room–the threat of governmental intrusion into the negotiations. While the FCC previously concluded that it has no authority to force any particular result in retrans negotiations beyond ensuring that the parties are negotiating in good faith, that has not stopped cable and satellite TV operators from regularly calling upon the FCC to intervene in negotiations. When the FCC resists, the call goes to Congress to “fix” retransmission laws or provide the FCC with authority to step in and alter the dynamics of a retrans negotiation. While such multichannel distributors certainly are hoping to place the government’s heavy thumb on their side of the scale, creating even the possibility of government intervention generates uncertainty which the cable or satellite TV operator hopes will cause the broadcaster to take the deal that’s on the table.
Uncertainty, however, is the enemy of efficient negotiations. When each party knows exactly where it stands, the parties focus on reaching an agreement and getting the deal done as quickly as possible. Where the possibility of government intervention is introduced, the parties cease focusing on each other and start playing to the FCC (or Congress). At best, that means grandstanding and delays in the negotiations while one party hopes to generate enough noise to entice the FCC to step in and get a better result than the party can negotiate on its own. At worst, it means creating high visibility blackouts in an effort to draw the FCC or Congress into launching retrans “reform”. Both approaches are the antithesis of efficient and swift negotiations, with one party quite literally putting off “getting down to business” in hopes that it is buying time for the FCC to join the fray. This approach has unfortunately made some Retrans 2.0 negotiations slow, messy, and unpleasant for all involved, including subscribers.
That is why this week’s CBS and Time Warner deal, regardless of its economic terms, is a watershed event. The negotiations started in typical Retrans 2.0 fashion, resulting in a blackout of CBS programming on Time Warner systems and the traditional public exchange of unpleasantries between the parties as government intervention was sought to protect subscribers from the loss of CBS programming. In fact, some have speculated that Time Warner dug in its heels specifically to create a high profile program disruption that might draw in Congress or the FCC. The FCC played its part in the drama, with a spokesman for the acting Chair of the FCC announcing just five days into the blackout that the agency “stand[s] ready to take appropriate action if the dispute continues.”
However, it is what happened in the nearly four weeks of CBS blackout after that comment was made that carried us from Retrans 2.0 into the world of Retrans 3.0. Specifically: the blackout occurred in the highest profile markets, but the government did not step in; the blackout was geographically widespread, but the government did not step in; the blackout involved high-profile network programming, but the government did not step in; the blackout drug on far longer than imagined, but the government did not step in; the blackout affected a major sporting event and threatened to affect upcoming NFL games, but the government did not step in. In short, it presented one of the most politically-appealing invitations for the government to second guess the path of a free market retrans negotiation, and the government declined to do so. Perhaps just as important, viewers came to realize that the sun still rose in the morning despite the CBS blackout, antenna manufacturers enjoyed a sales boost, and a retrans deal was achieved in less time than it typically takes Congress to name a post office.
Having seen the government’s lack of enthusiasm for getting involved in one of the most extreme examples of a blackout, parties to retrans negotiations will hopefully be able to retire “threatening to involve the government” as a negotiating tactic. While I have no illusions that such threats will now cease, their impact has been considerably diminished over the past month. The CBS/Time Warner dispute presented an unprecedented opportunity for broadcasters and multichannel providers to peer into the deepest recesses of their corporate closets and confirm that there is no government bogeyman residing within, waiting to pounce on unsuspecting negotiators. Freed from the need to look over their shoulder during retrans negotiations, or to play to the governmental crowd, parties can focus on getting retrans deals done quickly and efficiently, without being distracted by the uncertainties and contingency planning surrounding disruptions from outside the negotiating room.
Blackouts are caused by one or both parties to a retrans negotiation misgauging their negotiating power relative to the other party. While that will inevitably still happen from time to time for the same reasons it happens in any business negotiation, the legacy of Retrans 3.0 is that it should no longer happen because one party thinks that if it delays enough, or causes enough of a public stir over a retrans dispute, the FCC will come to its rescue. The result will be better for all, including subscribers.
Recently, TVNewsCheck.com ran a short item noting that a large broadcast group (not a network owned and operated group) and a large multichannel video distributor (MVPD) successfully concluded carriage negotiations. There was no interruption of service. Given the successful outcome, I was surprised to see that someone posted a comment regarding the piece saying the deal illustrates why the FCC should tighten its broadcast ownership rules. No matter how many times I read comments of this sort, I am perplexed that people actually believe it’s a good thing for the government to mandate that broadcasters be the underdogs in all major negotiations that impact the quality and availability of broadcasters’ programming. If anything, government policy should encourage broadcasters to grow to a scale that is meaningful in today’s complex television marketplace. Not one of the other major distributors makes its programming available for free.
If independent (non-O&O) broadcasters aren’t permitted to achieve a scale large enough to negotiate effectively with upstream programmers and downstream distributors, you won’t have to wait long see high cost, high quality, high value programming available for free to those who choose to opt out of the pay TV ecosystem. It’s much better to have two, three or four strong competitors in each market, owned by companies that can compete for rational economics in the upstream and downstream markets, than to have eight or more weak competitors, few of which can afford to invest in truly local service or negotiate at arms-length with program suppliers and distributors.
For those who have not been paying attention, the television market has changed profoundly in the past 20 years. The big programmers and the big MVPDs have gotten a whole lot bigger. The largest non-O&O broadcast groups have grown too, but not nearly as much. Fox, Disney/ABC, NBCU and the other programmers are vastly bigger companies with incomparable market power vis-a-vis even the largest broadcast groups. The same is true of the large MVPDs, which together serve the great majority of television households.
There’s nothing inherently bad about big content aggregators and big MVPD distributors. And anyway, they are a fact of life. Despite their size, each is trying to deliver a competitive service and deliver good returns for shareholders. That’s what they are supposed to do, and in general (with a few exceptions) they serve the country well. But again, they are much, much larger than even the largest broadcast groups. If you believe that having a viable and competitive free television option is a good thing, that’s a problem.
So in response to the suggestion that the FCC further limit the scale of broadcasters, I reply: why does the government make it so damn hard for the only television service that is available for free to bargain and compete with vastly larger enterprises that are comparatively unregulated?
While the FCC gets to have a say in nearly every sale or merger in the communications industry, no matter how small, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission will also be called upon if a transaction is large enough. The test for when a transaction is large enough to require a filing with the DOJ or the FTC is whether it exceeds the minimum financial thresholds of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act.
Because of inflation and other factors, however, the HSR thresholds must be annually adjusted to accurately separate small deals from big deals. This separation is critical because the DOJ and the FTC have limited resources to investigate transactions, and therefore only require advance notification of transactions that involve companies or transactions above a certain minimum size. Transactions that fall below the HSR reporting thresholds, however, are not immune from antitrust scrutiny even after they are consummated if they are likely to have an anticompetitive effect in any relevant market.
On February 27, 2012, the HSR thresholds will increase significantly, with the “minimum size-of-transaction test” threshold increasing from $50 million to $68.2 million. If the value of the proposed transaction is above $68.2 million but below $272.8 million (up from $200 million), reporting is required only if the ultimate parents of the acquiring and acquired entities meet certain “size-of-person” tests, the thresholds for which will also increase on February 27, 2012. Subject to a myriad of exemptions, transactions valued at over $272.8 million under the HSR regulations must generally be reported. If that sounds complicated (and it can be), Pillsbury’s Antitrust lawyers recently published an Advisory with more details on these changes.
While transactions that meet these thresholds must be reported whether or not they are communications-related, the thresholds can be particularly relevant to large broadcasters, since broadcasters that enter into a transaction requiring an HSR filing need to be aware that they may not be able to implement a local marketing agreement or similar cooperative arrangement in conjunction with an anticipated acquisition until the HSR filing has been made and the mandatory post-filing waiting period has either passed without action by the DOJ/FTC, or the DOJ/FTC have agreed to terminate the HSR waiting period early.
With communications transactions starting to heat up again, the increase in the HSR thresholds is welcome, and may simplify transactions that fall above the current HSR thresholds, but below the new ones.
In an uncertain economy, obtaining financing for business transactions can be a challenge. It can be even more challenging for FCC licensees, since FCC rules prohibit granting a security interest in an FCC license. Because lenders want an enforceable lien on all of a borrower’s assets, when those assets include FCC licenses, agreements must be structured carefully to give a lender all of the economic benefits of holding a security interest in the FCC license, without taking a security interest in the license itself.
The standard approach has been to provide the lender with a security interest in the “proceeds” of a license sale. That approach was called into question last October after a decision by the Colorado Bankruptcy Court (In re Tracy), which held that a security interest in the proceeds of an FCC license does not survive bankruptcy. While many communications lawyers saw this decision as an aberration, and the New York Bankruptcy Court (In re Terrestar Networks) rejected it outright in reaching an opposite conclusion last month, just a few days after that New York decision, on appeal, the Colorado U.S. District Court affirmed the reasoning in Tracy, once again opening the issue to debate.
The FCC announced in April 2009 its intent to implement a new version of its biennial Ownership Report form, and to require that all commercial broadcast stations file a new Ownership Report with the FCC by November 1 of odd-numbered years. Since that time, the FCC has had to delay the original November 2009 filing deadline a number of times, for reasons ranging from its electronic filing system grinding to a halt and being unable to handle the sheer mass of the new reports, to technical glitches with the form itself, delays in Office of Management and Budget approval, and fierce opposition from broadcasters at the FCC, OMB and now in court based upon the paperwork burden and privacy concerns the new form raises. As we discussed in an earlier Client Alert, the FCC’s revised deadline requires parties to report their November 1, 2009 ownership data on the new form by July 8, 2010.
As that deadline draws near, however, it looks like there are still a few obstacles that the FCC must navigate. As we reported in a recent Client Alert, the FCC yesterday responded to a petition filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit by a group of broadcasters. Those broadcasters have asked the court to stop the FCC from implementing the revised Form 323, arguing that the requirement that all “attributable” principals provide their Social Security Number (SSN) to obtain a Federal Registration Number (FRN) for the new ownership report violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Privacy Act. In its court-ordered response to these allegations, the FCC claims it has complied with the law, and that the broadcasters’ claims are moot in any event because filers are no longer actually required to provide their SSNs and can instead apply for a “Special Use FRN” (SUFRN) (love that acronym!) to complete the new ownership report form.
That response is not, however, entirely accurate. The FCC initially refused to create a Special Use FRN for purposes of reporting ownership interests. It feared that broadcast investors would choose to use that option rather than supplying their SSN, thereby undercutting the FCC’s ability to determine precisely which “Ted Jones” was the owner of a particular radio station. The FCC relented only when it became clear that many broadcasters would be unable to file their Ownership Reports at all since they had no ability to force their investors to reveal SSNs, and the FCC’s electronic filing system would not accept an ownership report if all attributable investors listed did not have an SSN-obtained FRN.
Even when the FCC later relented and created the SUFRN, it limited its use to the filing of biennial ownership reports (as opposed to post-sale ownership reports or other FCC applications). The FCC also made clear that the use of a SUFRN, while technically allowing broadcasters to file their ownership reports through the electronic filing system, did not comply with its rules and that it expected broadcasters to have obtained SSN-obtained FRNs before the next biennial ownership report is due in November 2011.
Since that time, and under continuing pressure from communications lawyers and privacy advocates (who are often one and the same), the FCC appears to be growing more flexible about the use of SUFRNs in completing ownership reports. Action by the court in the short time remaining until the July 8, 2010 filing deadline may determine just how flexible the FCC will need to be in that regard, and whether the filing deadline might have to be extended yet one more time.